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Intranational Trade and Regional Tax Rates:
A Welfare Analysis on the U.S. Economy
Hakan Yilmazkuday
Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of personal tax rates on macroeconomic variables at re-
gional and national levels through a general equilibrium trade model with private and public
sectors, migrating individuals, intermediate inputs and nal goods trade, and an analytical
solution. The regional model can explain state-level variables in the U.S. almost perfectly.
The counterfactuals on the U.S. economy suggest that a nationwide increase in the state-
level dividend-income tax rates would be the best option to expand the private sector, tax
revenues, and, most importantly, the individual welfare in all states; a nationwide increase in
the state-level wage-income tax rates would hurt the economy in all states; property and sales
taxes have fewer e¤ects on the U.S. economy. The results are mainly driven by intermediate
input trade.
JEL Classication: H24, H71, R12, R13, R32
Key Words: Regional Taxes, Trade, Public Sector, Private Sector, the U.S.
Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA; e-mail: skuday@gmail.com
1. Introduction
Tax rates are the key ingredients of public policy and a¤ect the allocation of resources through
optimizing agents in a micro-founded setup. In a world with many types of taxes and high inter-
action among macroeconomic variables, it is hard to determine which tax type is the best option
for the economy, because an economy may benet or su¤er from a tax rate change. One should be
careful while dening economy and best : The best nationwide policy may not be the best one for all
regions of the economy, or the best local policy may not be the best one for the national economy.
Therefore, regional policy implications should be obtained through investigating regional tax rates
and (i) the e¤ects of a nationwide tax rate change on all regions (i.e., nationwide and local e¤ects
of nationwide policy), (ii) the e¤ects of a tax rate change in a region on other regions, and thus,
the national economy (i.e., nationwide e¤ects of local policy), (iii) the e¤ect of a nationwide tax
rate change on each region (local e¤ects of nationwide/federal policy), (iv) the e¤ect of a tax rate
change in a region on that region (i.e., local e¤ects of local policy). Such an investigation cannot be
achieved through a national macro (i.e., an aggregated-level) analysis; one rather needs a regional
(i.e., a disaggregated-level) analysis that considers interactions among regions of a nation.
Determining optimal regional tax rates is one of the biggest issues at the regional level, because
regional tax rates are the main policy tools of regional governments; e.g., consider the states of the
U.S.: The recent national recession had such a devastating e¤ect on state nances in the U.S. that
states took in $87 billion less in tax revenue from October 2008 through September 2009 than they
collected in the previous 12 months; this corresponds to a decline of 11 percent, the steepest on
record, resulted from the impact on tax collections of reduced wages and lowered economic activity
(see Johnson et al., 2010). The requirement that states have balanced budgets has increased the
pressure on states to deal with the unprecedented revenue shortfalls in a variety of ways; to recoup
lost revenue, states have taken actions such as increasing rates. The story is very similar to the
slowdown of the U.S. economy in 2001 when many states raised taxes to balance their budgets (see
Orszag and Stiglitz, 2001). However, in a world of interacting regions, which type of tax is the best
policy tool in each state to improve its economy, or is there any nationwide/federal policy that
can lead to improvement in all states? Answering this question requires considering interactions
among regions of a nation (or union) through a general equilibrium analysis that will solve for all
regional variables simultaneously with optimizing agents at the regional level; nationwide variables
should be implied through such a regional analysis.
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This paper introduces a general equilibrium regional trade model to investigate possible ef-
fects of regional tax rates on the macroeconomic variables at the regional and national levels in
the long run. The model consists of a nite number of regions, nite number of individuals in
each region, a private monopolistically-competitive rm in each region, a non-prot public sector
(i.e., government) in each region, region-specic (wage-income, dividend-income, property, sales)
taxes, intermediate inputs and nal goods trade across regions, and migrating individuals. As will
be evident below, the modeling strategy that we follow is not arbitrary, and it is partly to cap-
ture the economic interactions in the U.S. economy (e.g., interregional trade in nal consumption
goods and intermediate inputs), partly to investigate dividend-income taxes (e.g., prots through
monopolistically-competitive rms), partly to obtain an analytical solution that considers migra-
tion (e.g., nite numbers of regions and individuals), and partly for simplicity (e.g., a non-prot
public sector). The private rm in each region is perfectly specialized in the production of a
good/variety so that it has a market power to set its price with a markup over its marginal cost
where the markup is a function of the elasticity of substitution across private-sector goods. Public
sector in each region produces a unique public good until the total costs are equalized to total
taxes collected in that region. The total amount of the public good in each region is equally
shared among the individuals in that region; the public good is nontradable. Both private and
public sectors in each state have constant returns to scale production technologies that use labor
and intermediate inputs purchased from the private sector in all regions as factors of production
and are subject to region-specic technology levels. Individuals have utilities from nal goods
of the private sector coming from all regions, the unique public good in their region, and the
property/land that they live at, and they have disutility from supplying labor to either private or
public rms; the regional taxes come into the picture in the budget constraint of the individuals.
There is a unique labor market in the nation/union (i.e., aggregation of all regions) where the total
labor demand coming from private and public sectors are matched with the labor supply coming
from the individuals in all regions; i.e., individuals may live and work in di¤erent regions. The
total prot of monopolistically-competitive private sector in all regions is equally shared among
all individuals in all regions. Because each private rm (in each region) supplies its traded good
to individuals in all regions (as a nal consumption good), to all private rms in all regions (as
an intermediate input), and to the public sector in all regions (as an intermediate input), there
are interactions between the public sector and the private sector in all regions. The exports of
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each private rm (in each region) are subject to iceberg trade costs which is important to include
geographical characteristics of regions into the model. The land as a factor of production has been
extensively used and analyzed in the literature; however, to focus on fewer-analyzed individual-tax
e¤ects at the regional and national levels, this paper does not consider location choice of rms
or corporate taxes but controls for the land used by rms through introducing a region-specic
parameter for the fraction of land used by individuals. This fraction is further estimated through
the empirical analysis. The land in each region is owned by the public sector in that region, and
its revenue is an additional source for the production of the public good.
In equilibrium, private-sector goods, public-sector goods, property/land, and labor markets are
cleared, and individual-level utilities are equalized through migration of individuals across regions.
Region-specic tax rates, technology levels (of private and public sectors), iceberg trade costs, land
sizes, and the total population in all regions are the exogenous variables of the model, while the
elasticity of substitution across goods and the region-specic fractions of land that are supplied
to individuals are model parameters. The model can be analytically solved; i.e., variables at the
regional and national levels can be expressed in terms exogenous variables and model parameters.
The state-level data of production, consumption, government expenditure, and interstate bilateral
trade from the U.S. are explained almost perfectly by the model. Since the model is a regional
one, it is rich enough for the U.S. counterfactuals at the state and national levels.
This paper focuses on the e¤ects of personal (individual) tax rates on the U.S. macroeconomic
variables: The best policy tools (among wage-income, dividend-income, property, and sales taxes)
to expand the private sector, tax revenues (i.e., the public sector), and the individual welfare are
investigated at the state and national levels. The results have public-policy implications for the
U.S. Federal Government: (i) a 1% nationwide increase in dividend-income tax rates would result
in about 5.25% raise in welfare measured by individual utility; (ii) a 1% nationwide increase in
wage-income tax rates would result in about 3.77% fall in welfare; (iii) property and sales taxes
have fewer e¤ects on the U.S. economy (i.e., a 1% nationwide increase in property taxes results in
0.43% raise in welfare, while a 1% nationwide increase in sales taxes results in 0.26 fall in welfare).
We show that these implications are mostly due to allowing for intermediate input trade between
private and public sectors; i.e., with a higher tax revenue, the public sector produces more output
and hence purchases more intermediate inputs from the private sector, which, in turn, raises overall
output and welfare in the economy. When we shut down intermediate input trade, the numbers
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turn such that (i) a 1% nationwide increase in dividend-income tax rates would result in about
2.55% fall in welfare measured by individual utility; (ii) a 1% nationwide increase in wage-income
tax rates would result in about 0.58% fall in welfare; (iii) a 1% nationwide increase in sales taxes
would result in 2.42% fall in welfare. Therefore, considering intermediate inputs plays an important
role in the determination of optimal public policy. The results also have public-policy implications
for the individual state governments in the U.S.; e.g., California would benet signicantly from
an increase in any tax type but wage-income tax; states like Delaware, Idaho, Montana, South
Dakota, and Wyoming do not have enough power to a¤ect their individualswelfare through state-
specic tax changes, and so on. Therefore, optimal public policy (through individual taxes) in
each state is di¤erent due to the interactions among states with di¤erent sizes.
This paper is connected to the literature investigating the e¤ects of regional taxes on economic
activity and interregional individual migration which has found mixed results with regard to the
inuence of tax policy on location decisions of individuals and the resulting economic activity.1
Although it is impossible to mention all relevant studies in this wide literature, the variation in
results is due to many factors such as di¤erences in how economic activity or tax policies are
measured. Cebula (1979) and Charney (1993) show that many scal characteristics have e¤ects on
individual utility and thus migration; these include tax and expenditure policies of governments
that may change income and the subsequent consumption of individuals. However, most studies
are not able to capture the possibility that some individuals are attracted to higher tax burdens
if the ensuing government spending is benecial to them while others are repelled by the higher
tax burden as described in the subnational redistribution literature (Dalenberg and Partridge,
1995; Hindriks, 1999, 2001;Razin et al., 2002; Wildasin, 1991, 1994); Knapp et al. (2001) nd
that higher state income tax liabilities encourage people to stay. The evidence on the e¤ects of
regional government revenues (i.e., government size) on regional growth is mixed: for the states
of the U.S., while the e¤ect is negative in early 1980s, it has disappeared in early 2000s (see
Deskins and Hill, 2010). This paper is able to model that the type of tax is the key in explaining
these mixed evidence. There is also another part of the literature that estimates the elasticity of
taxable income with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate (one minus the marginal tax rate; see
Feldstein, 1995, Giertz (2007), Long (1999), Bruce et al., 2010); compared to these studies, this
1Besides many classical papers by Harberger, Mieszkowski, Shoven and Whalley, see Partridge and Rickman
(1998) for a discussion of regional public nance computable general equilibrium studies. There is also a wide
literature focusing on regional taxes and rm location; see Bartik (1991, 1994), and Wasylenko (1997) for surveys.
5
paper decomposes the e¤ects of di¤erent tax types on wage income and dividend income through
a general equilibrium framework.
2. The Economic Environment
The economy of a country (or a union) consisting of nite number of regions, individuals, rms (i.e.,
private sector), and local governments (i.e., public sector) is modeled. The nontechnical summary
of the model has already been discussed in the introduction section, so we will not repeat it here.
The analysis is made for a typical region, r. Each region is specialized in the manufacturing of a
unique good; e.g., region r produces good r. An individual is denoted by h, and total number of
individuals in region r is Hr.
2.1. Individuals
A typical individual h in region r maximizes:
Ur (h)  log
 
CCr (h)

+ log
 
CLr (h)

+ log
 
CPr (h)
  log (Nr (h)) (2.1)
where CCr (h) is a per capita composite index of consumption goods, C
L
r (h) is per capita land,
CPr (h) is per capita public good in region r, and Nr (h) is per capita hours of labor supplied. The
composite index of consumption goods in region r is further dened as:
CCr (h) =
 X
i
(r;i)
1

 
CCr;i (h)
  1

! 
 1
where CCr;i (h) is per capita consumption in region r of good i (produced in region i),  > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution across goods, and nally r;i is a source- and destination-specic taste
parameter. The model will allow for migration of individuals across regions, below; hence, one
can be skeptical about having region-specic taste parameters, r;is in the utility function. In
particular, these r;is will remain region specic even after migration; i.e., if an individual will
move from the New York to Florida, she will encounter new taste parameters that are specic to
Florida. In addition to providing simplicity for the analytical solution, this particular assumption
is realistic when one compares the living conditions, say, between New York and Florida; e.g., a
winter coat (i.e., a variety of coat), say, imported from Georgia and consumed in New York may
be replaced by a spring coat (i.e., another variety of coat), say, imported from Wisconsin when
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an individual moves from New York to Florida. Later in the model, r;is will be connected to the
geographical location of each region through trade costs.
Besides the labor income, each individual also receives   (h) as prot income, independent of
her location of residence. In this context, the individual in region r maximizes Equation 2.1 subject
to the following budget constraint:
PLr C
L
r (h)
 
1 + tLr

+ PCr C
C
r (h)
 
1 + tCr
  WNr (h)  1  tWr +   (h)  1  tDr  (2.2)
where PLr is the price of land in region r, t
L
r is the tax rate on land (i.e., property tax) in region r,
PCr is the price of the composite-consumption good in region r, t
C
r is the sales tax rate in region
r, W is hourly nominal wage determined in the national labor market, tWr is the wage-income tax
rate in region r, and tDr is the dividend-income tax rate in region r.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure yields the following demand function for con-
sumption goods:
CCr;i (h) = r;i
 
PCr;i
PCr
! 
CCr (h)
where PCr 
P
i r;i
 
PCr;i
1  11 
is the cost-of-living index in region r. It follows from the
equations above that
P
i P
C
r;iCr;i (h) = P
C
r C
C
r (h).
The individual maximizes utility by choosing CCr (h), C
L
r (h), and Nr (h); the amount of public
good is determined by the public sector. Therefore, the optimality condition for the individual is
given by:
PCr C
C
r (h)
 
1 + tCr

= PLr C
L
r (h)
 
1 + tLr

= WNr (h)
 
1  tWr

(2.3)
Combining Equations 2.2 and 2.3, an expression for per capita labor supply is obtained:
Nr (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

W (1  tWr )
(2.4)
which depends on region-specic dividend- and wage-income taxes together with the dividend
income.
Equation 2.3 implies the following expenditure ratio on consumption goods across regions r
and i:
PCr C
C
r (h)
PCi C
C
i (h)
=
 
1 + tCi
  
1  tDr

(1 + tCr ) (1  tDi )
(2.5)
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which is basically an expression of region-specic sales and dividend-income taxes. Similarly, the
following is the expenditure ratio on land across regions r and i:
PLr C
L
r (h)
PLi C
L
i (h)
=
 
1 + tLi
  
1  tDr

(1 + tLr ) (1  tDi )
(2.6)
2.2. Production
There are two types of production in this economy: (i) consumption-good production by the private
sector, (ii) public-good production by the public sector.
2.2.1. Private-Sector Production
A monopolistically-competitive private-sector production rm in region r produces good r (i.e.,
perfect specialization) by using labor and intermediate inputs purchased from private-sector pro-
duction rms in all regions. The production is achieved according to the following constant returns
to scale function:
Y Cr = A
C
r
 
LCr
l  
GCr
g
(2.7)
where ACr represents good- and region-specic production technology, L
C
r represents labor, G
C
r
represents a composite intermediate input, and nally, l and g (= 1  l) represent the factor
shares which are the same across all production rms.
The rm chooses LCr and G
C
r , taking the wage rate and the price of intermediate goods as
given. To avoid any double taxation, the production rm does not pay any taxes (remember that
the individuals pay dividend taxes instead). Therefore, the cost minimization problem of the rm
is as follows:
min
LCr ;G
C
r
LCrW +G
C
r P
G
r
s.t. Y Cr = A
C
r
 
LCr
l  
GCr
g
which implies that the marginal cost of producing consumption good r (in region r) is given by:
MCCr =
 
ACr
 1W
l
l
PGr
g
g
(2.8)
where PGr is the intermediate input price index in the production of the consumption good in
region r.
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Intermediate goods that are used in the production of good r in region r are given by the
following index:
GCr =
 X
i
(r;i)
1

 
GCr;i
  1

! 
 1
where GGr;i is the intermediate input i (which is imported from region i). Note that the parameters
 and r;i are the same as in the utility function of the individuals; although assigning the same
parameters as for individuals is not standard, it is necessary to facilitate an analytical solution of
the model (as will be clearer, below). The optimality of the rm that produces good r gives the
following input demand functions:
GCr;i = r;i
 
PGr;i
PGr
! 
GCr (2.9)
where PGr;i is the price of the intermediate input imported from region i and P
G
r 
P
i r;i
 
PGr;i
1  11 
.
2.2.2. Public-Sector Production
The local government in region r produces a unique public-good by using labor and intermediate
inputs purchased from other consumption-good-producing rms in the economy:
Y Pr = A
P
r
 
LPr
l  
GPr
g
(2.10)
where APr represents good- and region-specic public-good-production technology, L
P
r is labor,
GPr represents the composite intermediate input, and nally, l and g (= 1  l) again represent the
factor shares which are the same across all production rms.
The local government chooses LPr and G
P
r , taking the wage rates and the price of intermediate
goods as given. The cost minimization problem of the rm is as follows:
min
LPr ;G
P
r
LPrW +G
P
r P
P
r
s.t. Y Pr = A
P
r
 
LPr
l  
GPr
g
which implies that the marginal cost of producing the public good in region r is given by:
MCPr =
 
APr
 1W
l
l
P Pr
g
g
(2.11)
where P Pr is the intermediate input price index in the production of the public good in region r.
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The local government receives all tax revenues together with the land payment itself, since it is
assumed to be the owner of all land. Although the simplifying assumption of the government being
the owner of all land is not a perfect one, it is to avoid modeling the distribution of ownership of
land, as well as issues related to private wealth e¤ects arising from changes in land values associated
with changes in public policy. The local government will produce the unique public good under
the following condition:
Hr
  
1 + tLr

PLr C
L
r (h) + t
C
r P
C
r C
C
r (h) + t
W
r WNr (h) + t
D
r   (h)

= Y Pr MC
P
r (2.12)
where Hr is the population in region r, and the right hand side is due to constant returns to scale
(i.e., g + l = 1). Equation 2.12 means that the public-sector in region r will produce public goods
until the total cost of production will be equal to the total tax revenue. Notice that the local
government is not involved in any game with other local governments and takes the tax rates as
given; tax rates are exogenously determined to focus on the policy implications of any tax-rate
change.
Intermediate goods that are used in the production of good r in region r are given by the
following index:
GPr =
 X
i
(r;i)
1

 
GPr;i
  1

! 
 1
where GPr;i is the intermediate input i (which is imported from region i), and the parameters of 
and r;i are the same as in the utility function of the individuals for the reasons discussed above.
The optimality of the local government results in the following input demand functions:
GPr;i = r;i
 
P Pr;i
P Pr
! 
GPr (2.13)
where P Pr;i is the price of the intermediate input imported from region i and P
P
r 
P
i r;i
 
P Pr;i
1  11 
.
2.3. Equilibrium
This section describes the aggregate properties of the model.
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2.3.1. Consumption-Good
Individuals of a typical region share the same technology parameters in the production of nal-good
consumption. Thus, in region r, the demand function for good i is given by:
CCr;i = r;i
 
PCr;i
PCr
! 
CCr (2.14)
where CCr;i =
PHr
h=1C
C
r;i (h) = HrC
C
r;i (h) is the total demand for good i, C
C
r =
PHr
h=1C
C
r (h) =
HrC
C
r (h) is the total demand for consumption goods, and Hr is the population.
2.3.2. Land
Individuals of a typical region equally share the xed amount of land. Thus, in region r, the
consumption of land is equal to the xed supply of it:
HrX
h=1
CLr (h) = HrC
L
r (h) = C
L
r = Y
L
r f
L
r (2.15)
where CLr is the total demand of land in region r, Y
L
r is the xed amount of land in region r and
fLr 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of land that is supplied (i.e., in use) in region r. Considering fraction
of land that is supplied is important to capture the economically utilized amount of land in each
region; e.g., parts of the states of Nevada, California, Oregon, Idaho and Utah may not be in use
due to The Great Basin Desert.
2.3.3. Public Good
Individuals of a typical region (say, r) share the total amount of unique public good:
HrX
h=1
CPr (h) = HrC
P
r (h) = C
P
r = Y
P
r (2.16)
where CPr is the total demand and Y
P
r is the total supply in region r.
2.3.4. Labor Market
The total labor supply of the individuals in all regions N is equal to the sum of the labor demand
of (both consumption good and public good production) rms in all regions L:
L =
X
r
 
LCr + L
P
r

=
X
r
HrX
h=1
Nr (h) =
X
r
Nr (h)Hr = N (2.17)
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2.3.5. Prots
The total amount of prot of consumption-good-producing rms in all regions is equally distributed
among the individuals in all regions who own an equal share of all rms:
  (h) =
P
r r
H
(2.18)
where r is the prot of consumption-good-producing rm in region r, and H =
P
rHr is the total
population in all regions.
2.3.6. Regional Budget Constraint
Now, the budget constraint of region r can be written as:
PLr C
L
r
 
1 + tLr

+ PCr C
C
r
 
1 + tCr
  WNr  1  tWr +  r  1  tDr  (2.19)
where WNr is the total wage income and  r = Hr  (h) is the total dividend income in region
r. Together with Equation 2.3, this implies the following expenditure ratio on consumption good
across regions r and i:
PCr C
C
r
PCi C
C
i
=
Hr
 
1 + tCi
   
1  tDr

Hi (1 + tCr ) ((1  tDi ))
the following expenditure ratio on land across regions r and i:
PLr C
L
r
PLi C
L
i
=
Hr
 
1 + tLi
   
1  tDr

Hi (1 + tLr ) ((1  tDi ))
and the following expenditure ratio between consumption good and land within region r:
PCr C
C
r
PLr C
L
r
=
1 + tLr
1 + tCr
2.3.7. Region Specic Utility, Population Levels, and Migration
In equilibrium, all regions are going to provide the very same level of individual utility; otherwise,
individuals are going to migrate to higher-individual-utility regions:
Ur (h) = Ui (h) for all i; r (2.20)
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2.3.8. Market Clearing Condition for the Private Sector
For each consumption good r (produced in region r), market clearing condition implies:
Y Cr =
X
i
(1 +  i;r)
 
CCi;r +G
C
i;r +G
P
i;r

(2.21)
where  i;r represents iceberg transport costs from region r to region i, CCi;r is the nal-good con-
sumption demand of region i for good r produced in region r, GCi;r is the intermediate input r used
in region i for the production of consumption good i, and GPi;r is the intermediate input r used in
region i for the production of public good i. Equation 2.21 basically says that good r (produced
in region r) is either consumed locally or by other regions, either for nal consumption or further
production. By using Equations 2.9, 2.14 and 2.14, the market clearing condition for good r can
be rewritten as:
Y Cr =
X
i
(1 +  i;r)
 
i;r
 
PCi;r
PCi
! 
CCi + i;r
 
PGi;r
PGi
! 
GCi + i;r
 
P Pi;r
P Pi
! 
GPi
!
=
X
i
 
(1 +  i;r) i;r

Pi;r
Pi
   
CCi +G
C
i +G
P
i
!
=
X
i
 
i;r
(1 +  i;r)
 1

Pr;r
PCi
   
CCi +G
C
i +G
P
i
!
(2.22)
where the second equality is due to Pi;r = PCi;r = P
G
i;r = P
P
i;r (since any traded good is subject to very
same trade costs) and thus Pi = PCi = P
G
i = P
P
i (due to their relation with Pi;r = P
C
i;r = P
G
i;r = P
P
i;r,
respectively, for all r), while the third equality is due to implication of iceberg transport costs (i.e.,
Pi;r = Pr;r (1 +  i;r) where Pr;r is the factory-gate price of good r in region r).
2.4. Price Setting
The private-sector rms in each region maximize their prots by using their market power, while
the public sector in each region considers its marginal costs to determine the amount of public
goods it will produce.
2.4.1. Private Sector
In region r, the private sector produces good r and faces the following prot maximization problem:
max
Pr;r
Y Cr

Pr;r  MCCr

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subject to Equation 2.21. The rst order condition for this problem is as follows:
Y Cr

1  
Pr;r
 
Pr;r  MCCr

= 0
which implies that:
Pr;r =

   1MC
C
r (2.23)
where 
 1 represents the gross mark-up.
The prot of the private sector in region r is implied as:
r = Y
C
r

Pr;r  MCCr

which further implies that the total amount of prots in all regions to be equally distributed to
individuals in all regions is: X
r
r =
X
r
Y Cr

Pr;r  MCCr

=
1
   1
X
r
Y Cr MC
C
r
Hence, the per-capita dividend payment in all regions is given by:
  (h) =
P
r r
H
=
1
H

1
   1
X
r
 
Y Cr MC
C
r

2.4.2. Public Sector
The non-prot local governments (i.e., the public sector) do not set prices but consider their costs
of production to determine the amount of public good that they will produce (through Equation
2.12):
Y Pr = Hr
  
1 + tLr

PLr C
L
r (h) + t
C
r P
C
r C
C
r (h) + t
W
r WNr (h) + t
D
r   (h)
MCPr
!
=
  
1 + tLr

PLr C
L
r + t
C
r P
C
r C
C
r + t
W
r WNr + t
D
r  r

(APr )
 1  W
l
l Pr
g
g (2.24)
where Equation 2.11 has been used in the second line. This means that the amount of public good
in each region will depend on the tax revenue and the marginal cost of public-good production.
A closed-form solution to the model is given in the Appendix.
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3. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis consists of two parts: (1) testing the empirical power of the model using
the U.S. state-level data covering 50 states and Washington D.C., (2) counterfactuals.
3.1. Empirical Power
The empirical power of the model is tested using the U.S. state-level data of (i) bilateral trade
across states, (ii) gross state product, (iii) consumption, (iv) government expenditure.
3.1.1. Parametrization and Estimation Methodology
The bilateral trade data across the U.S. states are obtained from Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) of
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics for the year 2007. CFS depicts both source and destination
states for the value of shipments (i.e., exports) that are measured at the source.2 To make the
connection between CFS and the model, we use the overall value of shipments. According to the
model of this paper, the total value of trade from region i to region r at the source (i.e., region i)
is given by the following expression:
PiiXri = Pii
 
CCr;i +G
C
r;i +G
P
r;i

(3.1)
where Xri = CCr;i+G
C
r;i+G
P
r;i represents the total quantity of exports, and the closed form solutions
of Pii; CCr;i; G
C
r;i; and G
P
r;i; are given by Equations 6.6, 6.17, 6.21, and 6.24, respectively. Note that
when r = i, the expression above represents the total value of trade within the region; the data for
intra-regional trade are also available in CFS. To test the model, the left hand side of Equation
3.1 (i.e., the trade data set coming from CFS) is compared with the right hand side of it (i.e., the
model).
The gross state product data for each U.S. state are obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) for the year 2007. According to the model of this paper, the gross domestic product in
2In CFS, shipments traversing the U.S. from a foreign location to another foreign location (e.g., from Canada
to Mexico) are not included. Shipments that are shipped through a foreign territory with both the origin and
destination in the U.S. are included in the CFS data; The mileages calculated for these shipments exclude the
international segments (e.g., shipments from New York to Michigan through Canada do not include any mileages
for Canada).
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region r (calculated by the value-added approach) is given by the following expression:
GSPr = PrrY
C
r +MC
P
r Y
P
r  
 X
i6=r
PCr;iG
C
r;i
!
 
 X
i
P Pr;iG
P
r;i
!
(3.2)
where the closed form solutions of Prr; Y Cr ;MC
P
r ; Y
P
r ; P
C
r;i; G
C
r;i; P
P
r;i; and G
P
r;i are given by Equations
6.6, 6.18, 6.14, 6.19, 6.7, 6.21, 6.8, and 6.24 respectively. To test the model, the left hand side of
Equation 3.2 (i.e., the gross state product data set coming from BEA) will be compared with the
right hand side of it (i.e., the model), below.
The value of consumption data for each U.S. state are the state-level retail sales obtained from
Bureau of Economic Analysis for the year 2007. According to the model of this paper, the value
of consumption in region r is given by PCr C
C
r where the closed form solutions for P
C
r and C
C
r are
given by Equations 6.9, 6.10, and 6.12. To test the model, the retail sales data will be compared
with PCr C
C
r (i.e., the model), below.
The value of government expenditure for each U.S. state are obtained from Bureau of Economic
Analysis for the year 2007.3 According to the model of this paper, the value of government
expenditure in region r is given by Y Pr MC
P
r where the closed form solutions for Y
P
r and MC
P
r are
given by Equations 6.19 and 6.14. To test the model, the government expenditure data will be
compared with Y Pr MC
P
r (i.e., the model), below.
Since the closed-form solution of all region-specic endogenous variables are given in terms
of region-specic exogenous variables and parameters (i.e., tax rates, technology levels of both
private and public sectors, iceberg trade costs, land sizes, the fraction of land that is supplied, total
population in all regions, and the elasticity of substitution across goods), we have to determine
these before the empirical test.
The tax rates are obtained from Tax Foundation for the year 2007. For each state, in the data,
when relevant, any tax rate is calculated as the sum of federal, social security, medicare, and state
taxes; the only exception are the state-level property tax rates which are calculated by using the
local tax paid for the median-value house in each state.4 Since most taxes are progressive (i.e.,
3Government expenditure at the state level is the sum of (i) Federal Government, (ii) State and Local Govern-
ments, (iii) Federal Reserve Banks, (iv) Credit Intermediation and Related Services, (v) Federal Civilian, and (vi)
Federal Military.
4The tax paid for the median-value house in each state has been obtained by dividing the median property taxes
paid on houses by the annual mortgage payment of the median-value house on a 30-year loan where the mortgage
rate has been taken as 6.2% for the year 2007.
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the tax rate increases as the taxable base amount increases), we use the national average income
published by the Social Security Administration for the year 2007 as the taxable base amount. The
tax rates in each state are given in Figure 1 on the U.S. map (after excluding outliers of Alaska,
Washington D.C., and Hawaii). As is evident, although wage-income, dividend-income and sales
taxes are somehow close to each other across states with a range of around 10%, the property taxes
are more dispersed where the west and the southeast of the U.S. has lower rates.
The private sector technology levels are obtained by multiplying each side of Equation 5.14 by
the ratio of source prices across regions a and b:
Pa;aY
C
a
Pb;bY Cb
=

Pa;a
Pb;b
1 
(3.3)
=

ACa
ACb
 1
where Equations 5.2 and 5.3 have been used in the second line. The left hand side of Equation
3.3 is obtained from CFS (i.e., the trade data above) by using the value of total exports in each
state (including trade within each state) as a measure of output. After setting the private-sector
technology level in California equal to one (i.e., ACCALIFORNIA = 1), A
C
a s for all a are identied
when the elasticity of substitution  is known.5
The public sector technology levels are calculated using Equation 5.27 where the tax rates are
as described above. After setting the public-sector technology level in California equal to one (i.e.,
APCALIFORNIA = 1), A
P
a s for all a are identied.
6 The public-sector technology level of each state
is provided on the U.S. map in Figure 1 (after excluding outliers of Alaska, Washington D.C., and
Hawaii); as is evident, the northeast and the middle of the country has higher levels compared to
other regions.
The iceberg trade costs between regions r and i are proxied using the following expression that
is generally used in the literature:
(1 +  i;r) = (Di;r)

where Di;r is the distance from region r to region i, and  represents the elasticity of distance.
The distances used are the actual (average) distances of shipment in miles provided by CFS (i.e.,
5There is no scale e¤ect of the private-sector technology levels on the empirical results, because we use the values
rather than quantities in the empirical analysis.
6There is no scale e¤ect of the public-sector technology levels on the empirical results, because we use the values
rather than quantities in the empirical analysis.
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the trade data above); these include the distance of shipment within each state. The elasticity of
distance  is going to be selected to match the trade data, as will be clearer below.
The total land size/area of each state in square miles (e.g., Y Lr for region r in the model) and
population of each state (e.g., Hr for region r in the model) is obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau for the year 2007. The fraction of land that is supplied in each state is calculated using
Equation 5.11 after setting the fraction equal to one in California (i.e., fLCALIFORNIA = 1). Notice
that the population of each state (which is an endogenous variable) is used only to calculate fLr s
for all r; in the empirical analysis, only the total population of all states (i.e., the population of
the U.S.) and fLr s are used. Both population levels and the fraction of land/area supplied in each
state are provided in Figure 1 (after excluding outliers of Alaska, Washington D.C., and Hawaii;
e.g., fLDC = 51:85, f
L
ALASKA = 0:004, ). The most appealing part is that Rhode Island, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Delaware all have fL values higher than 2 (i.e., the fraction of
land that they supply are at least twice what California supplies), while North Dakota, Montana,
Wyoming, and South Dakota all have fL values lower than 0.05 (i.e., the fraction of land that
they supply are at least 20 times lower than what California supplies). Since the model of this
paper does not focus on the land used in production, these gures of fL reect the fraction of land
consumed by the individuals as properties in each state; hence, we control for the land used in
production explicitly.
The only unknown parameters left that are necessary to simulate the model are the elasticity
of substitution across goods  and the elasticity of distance . Since these are mostly trade-
related parameters, to estimate them, given the data and parametrization above, the data vector
of bilateral trade across states is compared with the corresponding vector obtained by the model
subject to  and  values; i.e., given the parametrization so far,  and  are selected to match the
trade data best through a global grid search. This is the only estimation achieved in this paper.
3.1.2. Estimation Results
The estimation result in  = 3:0 and  = 0:38. In the literature, in terms of the elasticity of
substitution across goods , Hummels (2001) estimates range between 4.79 and 8.26; the estimates
of Head and Ries (2001) range between 7.9 and 11.4; the estimate of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) is
about 6.4; Harrigans (1996) estimates range from 5 to 10; Feenstras (1994) estimates range from
3 to 8.4; the estimate by Eaton and Kortum (2002) is about 9.28; the estimates by Romalis (2007)
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range between 6.2 and 10.9; the (mean) estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006) range between
4 and 17.3. Therefore, the estimate of this paper in terms of the elasticity of substitution across
goods lies in the lower part of the estimation range in the literature. In the literature, the elasticity
of distance  estimates are about 0.3 (see Hummels, 2001; Limao and Venables, 2001; Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2004); hence, the elasticity of distance estimate of this paper is slightly higher
compared to the literature.
After knowing for the elasticity of substitution  = 3, we can now also depict the private-sector
technology level in each state (i.e., ACr for all r); the descriptive analysis is given in Figure 1 (after
excluding outliers of Alaska, Washington D.C., and Hawaii). As is evident, California and Texas
have the highest level of private-sector technology (i.e., ACCALIFORNIA = 1; A
C
TEXAS = 0:99), while
Vermont, Rhode Island, Wyoming, and South Dakota have technology levels below 0.25.
3.1.3. Empirical Power of the Model
Although  = 3:0 and  = 0:38 match the trade data best, it does not mean that the model com-
pletely explains the data. In order to test the empirical power of model under the parametrization
of  = 3:0 and  = 0:38, we check the correlation between the model implications and the data for
trade, GSP, consumption, and government expenditure as they have been described above. The
results given in Figure 2 are very encouraging: The correlation between the model and the data
is 0.96 for trade7, 0.98 for GSP (where both the data and the model have been set to one for
California), 0.99 for consumption (where both the data and the model have been set to one for
California), and 0.98 for government expenditure (where both the data and the model have been
set to one for California).
3.2. Counterfactuals at the National Level
The model of this paper is rich enough to consider counterfactuals at the national level (e.g.,
the e¤ects of a nationwide change in tax rates) and the state level (e.g., the e¤ects of a state-
level change in tax rates). We will rst focus on the national-level counterfactuals, since they have
important federal public-policy implications for the U.S. economy. Given the tax rates in 2007, the
counterfactual analysis consists of investigating the e¤ects of nationwide changes in wage-income
7Although the correlation coe¢ cient reects the correlation between the levels, the gure for trade has log
variables in its axes for presentational purposes.
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taxes, dividend-income taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes on the macroeconomic variables at
the national and state levels. To achieve a welfare analysis, the macroeconomic variables that we
focus on are the individual welfare measured by the individual utility function and the components
of the individual utility function, namely per capita consumption good CCr (h), per capita land
CLr (h), per capita public good C
P
r (h), and per capita hours of work Nr (h).
The nationwide changes in tax rates are dened as equal percentage increases in the tax rates
in all states. The vertical axes in Figure 3 show the elasticities of variables with respect to tax
rates (where the elasticity is dened as usual: the e¤ect of a 1% change in tax rates on national
variables in percentage terms), and the horizontal axes show the percentage change in tax rates.
Although the individual utilities are equalized in the model by migration, each component of
the individual utility function may take di¤erent values in each state; hence, we will show the
average (across states) responses of CCr (h), C
L
r (h), C
P
r (h), and Nr (h). As is evident in the top
left part of Figure 3, an increase in dividend-income tax or property tax at the national level
increases individual welfare, and an increase in wage-income tax or sales tax decreases individual
welfare, ceteris paribus. The highest welfare increase is due to an increase in dividend-income
tax with an elasticity of about 5:25, and the highest welfare reduction is due to an increase in
wage-income tax with an elasticity of about  3:77; changes in sales or property taxes have almost
no e¤ects on individual welfare. Elasticities through dividend- and wage-income taxes need further
investigation, since they are signicantly high.
The rest of Figure 3 can help us understand the sources of these high elasticities. For instance,
the main sources of the high elasticity of individual welfare with respect to dividend-income tax
are through the changes in per capita consumption good and per capita public good; according to
the bottom right part of Figure 3, the fall in the price level seems to be e¤ective on these changes.
According to the model, the most e¤ective chain of logic is as follows: (i) The private-sector rms
produce more output to cover for increased dividend-income taxes, because the after-tax dividend-
income must remain the same in nominal wage terms (i.e., the numeraire) due to individual
optimality condition (caused by log-additive utility function). (ii) Raise in the private-sector
production lowers the price level and hence intermediate input costs for further production in the
private sector. (iii) Reduced intermediate input costs lead all rms to increase the intermediate-
input share g in production which increases the demand for the goods produced by private-sector
rms; hence the production in the private sector increases even more and the price level (in
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nominal wage terms) falls such that the per capita consumption of the consumption good increases.
(iv) Reduced intermediate input prices, together with higher tax revenues, lead to higher public
sector production and hence higher per capita public good consumption. (v) The increases in per
capita consumption good and per capita public good lead to higher individual welfare. The main
ingredient in this chain of logic is the existence of intermediate input trade in the model; i.e., the
individual welfare would not be positively a¤ected by the changes in dividend-income taxes in the
absence of intermediate input trade. To show this formally, consider the case with no intermediate
input trade by setting the share of intermediate input share in the production of both private and
public sector g to 0; i.e., make labor the only input. In such a case, the price level would depend
only on the nationwide wage rate, which would remain the same after a possible change in taxes,
because it is the numeraire. With a constant price level and an increased dividend-income tax, (i)
the per capita consumption of the consumption good would fall, (ii) individuals would supply fewer
labor to compensate for the reduction in per capita consumption, (iii) reduction in labor supply
would lead to fewer production in both public and private sectors, (iv) the fall in the public-sector
production due to lower labor supply would be higher than the raise in the public-sector production
due to higher tax revenue, because the prot of private-sector rms (hence, the tax revenue) would
further go down due to lower labor supply. The details of the special case with g = 0 are given
in Figure 4 where the changes in CCr (h), C
L
r (h), C
P
r (h), Nr (h) and the overall utility due to a
change in dividend-income tax are depicted. Figure 4 supports the claim of having negative e¤ects
of dividend-income tax increases on individual welfare in the absence of intermediate input trade.
Hence, intermediate inputs play an important role in determining the welfare implications of tax
rate changes.
A similar analysis can be achieved for the wage-income tax as well. According to Figure 3,
the main sources of the high elasticity of individual welfare with respect to wage-income tax are
through the changes in per capita consumption good and per capita hours of work; this time, the
increase in the price level seems to be the reason for such changes. According to the model, the
most e¤ective chain of logic this time is as follows: (i) Individuals work more to compensate for
lower after-tax wage income. (ii) Higher labor supply leads to an increase in the labor input share l
in the production of both private and public sectors. (iii) Increased labor input share leads to lower
intermediate input trade and hence reduces private-sector production. (iv) Lower private-sector
production, together with higher prices, lead to lower per capita consumption of the consumption
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good. (v) Lower per capita consumption, together with higher per capita hours of work, leads to
lower individual welfare. Again, this particular result is due to the existence of intermediate input
trade. To see why, consider again the case with no intermediate input trade, i.e., g = 0. In such
a case, the price level would remain the same after the change in wage-income tax rate, as above.
With a constant price level and an increased wage-income tax, (i) individuals would work more to
compensate for lower after-tax wage income, (ii) higher labor supply would lead to an increase in
private-sector production until the reduction in after-tax wage income is compensated by higher
per capita consumption of the consumption good, (iii) however, high labor supply would also imply
higher production in the public sector that uses only labor as the factor of production now, (iv)
higher public-sector production means higher per capita public-good consumption, (v) the fall in
individual welfare due to higher labor supply would be higher than the raise in individual welfare
due to higher per capita public good, because we have a log-additive utility function with equal
shares on per capita public good and hours of work with opposite signs. The details of the special
case with g = 0 are again given in Figure 4 where the changes in CCr (h), C
L
r (h), C
P
r (h), Nr (h)
and the overall utility due to a change in wage-income tax are depicted. Figure 4 supports the
view that an increase in wage-income tax in the absence of intermediate input trade leads to lower
individual welfare. Hence, once again, intermediate inputs play an important role in determining
the welfare implications of tax rate changes.
Although the e¤ects of sales and property taxes on individual welfare are minor, they can still
be investigated by Figure 3. For instance, when sales taxes increase, (i) individuals start consuming
fewer private-sector consumption goods, (ii) the fall in demand for consumption goods leads to
lower prices, (iii) lower prices lead to higher public-sector production through lower intermediate
input prices, (iv) per capita consumption of the consumption good falls but per capita consumption
of the public good increases; hence, the overall e¤ect on individual welfare is minimal. Similarly,
when property taxes increase, (i) individuals start consuming fewer land, (ii) individuals work
more to compensate for lower land, (iii) production increases in both private and public sectors,
(iv) the overall e¤ect on the individual welfare is again minimal.
Figure 3 depicts the e¤ects of national tax rate changes on the national (aggregate) variables,
but it does not provide any information regarding how each state is a¤ected by such policies. The
left panels of Tables 1-4 bridge this gap by providing the state-level elasticities of endogenous
variables with respect to nationwide tax rates. The geographical presentation of Tables 1-4 are
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provided on the U.S. maps in Figures 5-8 (after excluding outliers of Alaska, Washington D.C.,
and Hawaii).
The left panel of Table 1 and Figure 5 depict the elasticities of state-level variables with
respect to nationwide wage-income tax rates. As is evident, although the individual-level utilities
are equalized across states, there is evidence for heterogeneity in the components of the individual
utility in terms of state-level responses to the changes in tax rates.
3.3. Counterfactuals at the State Level
We will now focus on the state-level (local) counterfactuals (i.e., the e¤ect of a state-level change in
tax rates), since they have important public-policy implications for each state. Given the tax rates
in 2007, the counterfactual analysis consists of investigating the e¤ects of a state-level change in
wage-income taxes, dividend-income taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes on the macroeconomic
variables at the state-level (where we skip the results on national-level variables which are less
signicant when state-level changes in tax rates are considered).
The state-level changes in tax rates are dened as percentage changes in the tax rates in
only one state. The right panels of Tables 1-4 and Figure 9-12 (after excluding outliers of Alaska,
Washington D.C., and Hawaii) show the elasticities of state-level variables with respect to tax rates
in the very same states, ceteris paribus (i.e., the percentage change in state-level variables with
respect to one percent increase in tax rates; the elasticities are almost identical when calculated
with respect to one percent decrease in tax rates).
The right panel of Table 1 and Figure 9 depict the elasticities of state-level variables with
respect to their-own-state-level wage-income tax rates. As is evident, individual welfare in all
states are a¤ected negatively by an increase in state-level wage-income tax, and there is signicant
heterogeneity across states in terms of magnitudes. For instance, California has an elasticity of
about  0:43 and Wyoming of about  0:01. When we investigate the components of the individual
utility function, the di¤erence between California and Wyoming seems to be due to the di¤erences
in the responses of per capita consumption of the consumption good in these two states; i.e.,
per capita consumption in California falls by 0.21 percent and it remains almost the same in
Wyoming. The chain of logic through the model of this paper is pretty much the same as in
the counterfactuals at the national level, above; one important di¤erence here is that tax rate
changes in one state cannot be as e¤ective as a nationwide tax rate change. In particular, due
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to the economic interactions between states (especially the national labor market), each state is
a¤ected according to its population level; this is why the most populated state, California, is
a¤ected most, and the least populated state, Wyoming is a¤ected least. Similarly, the right panels
of Table 2-4 and Figures 10-12 depict the elasticities of state-level variables with respect to their-
own-state-level dividend-income tax rates, property taxes, and sales taxes, respectively; for all tax
types, although the chains of logic are the same as in the counterfactuals at the national level, the
di¤erences in elasticities across states are again mostly due to the population level of each state.
Many state-level public-policy implications follow; e.g., California would benet signicantly from
an increase in any tax type but wage-income tax; states like Delaware, Idaho, Montana, South
Dakota, andWyoming simply do not have enough power to a¤ect their individualswelfare through
state-specic tax changes, and so on. Therefore, optimal public policy (through individual taxes)
in each state is di¤erent due to the interactions among states with di¤erent sizes.
4. Concluding Remarks and Discussion
Regional taxes are important public-policy tools that have implications on macroeconomic variables
at both regional and national levels. This paper has introduced a general equilibrium regional trade
model with an analytical solution to investigate the implications of regional taxes that individuals
pay. The model is rich enough to consider a private sector, a public sector, individual migration,
intermediate inputs trade, and nal goods trade across regions. State-level evidence from the U.S.
support the model almost perfectly. The analytical solution of the model makes counterfactuals
tractable, which suggest for the U.S. economy that a nationwide increase in the state-level dividend-
income tax rates would be the best option to expand the private sector, public sector, and, most
importantly, the individual welfare in all states; a nationwide increase in the state-level wage-
income tax rates would hurt the economy in all states; property and sales taxes have fewer e¤ects
on the U.S. economy. We show that these results are mainly driven by intermediate input trade
between private and public sectors. The empirical results also depict the elasticities of national-
and state-level macroeconomic variables with respect to both nationwide and state-specic tax
rates; e.g. California is positively (respectively, negatively) a¤ected most, among all states, by
changes in its dividend-income, property, and sales taxes (respectively, wage-income tax), while
Wyoming is one of the least a¤ected by any of its tax rate change. Since the data of this paper is
from the year 2007, these results correspond to important policy suggestions for local governments,
24
especially after the slowdown in the national economy that has started through the end of the year
2007.
This paper has focused on the elasticities of macroeconomic variables with respect to regional
taxes, which are accepted as given, to investigate regional-policy implications. As Kehoe (2003)
puts perfectly in the context of technology levels, the point is not that one should want to take
the regional taxes as exogenous; in fact, the point is exactly the opposite: if a model with regional
taxes treated as exogenous accounts for most regional and macroeconomic uctuations/trends,
then it will be clear that it is changes in regional taxes that needs to be explained; this paper has
followed this strategy. For sure, such regional taxes can be endogenized through introducing tax
competition across regional governments (among many others, see literature surveys of Wilson,
1999; Paty, 2008); this would generate richer comparative statics.
The results of this paper should be qualied with respect to the structural model that does
not allow corporate taxes or rms to use land as a factor of production; this is mostly to keep
the model as simple as possible and to focus on regional taxes that individuals pay rather than
regional corporate taxes, since the latter has been investigated extensively in the literature (see
Morgan et al., 1989; Buss, 2001). Nevertheless, the model has been set in such a way that
explicitly controls for possible e¤ects of land-using rms in the data (i.e., through the fraction
of land supplied to individuals in each state). Other than using land as a factor of production
and considering corporate taxes, the model and results are subject to further improvement also
through introducing an industry-level model, extending to model to examine short-term dynamics,
considering factor endowments other than land, considering tax exemptions, introducing migration
costs (to investigate same-sign problem), considering tax capitalizations, introducing excise taxes,
and/or di¤erentiating between local and federal governments (e.g., vertical externalities); these
would also generate richer comparative statics.
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5. Appendix A: Analytical Solution and Implications
This section presents the closed-form solution of the model. By using Equations 2.8 and 2.23, the
price of consumption good r at the factory gate in region r can be written as:
Pr;r =

   1
 
ACr
 1W
l
l
Pr
g
g
(5.1)
Equation 5.1 implies that the ratio of factory gate price of goods a and b is given by:
Pa;a
Pb;b
=
ACb (Pa)
g
ACa (Pb)
g (5.2)
which is inversely related to the variety (region) specic technology levels.
To keep the model tractable, the region-specic parameters r;is are assumed to be functions
of transport costs; i.e., r;i = (1 +  r;i)
( 1). Together with Pr;i = Pi;i (1 +  r;i), this implies that
Pr 
 X
i
r;i (Pr;i)
1 
! 1
1 
=
 X
i
(Pi;i)
1 
! 1
1 
which means that
PCr = P
G
r = P
P
r = Pr = Pi = P for all r and i (5.3)
Combined with Equation 5.1, this implies that
P =
 
1
AC
 

   1

W
l
l
1
g
g!! 11 g
(5.4)
where AC =
P
i
 
ACi
 1 1 1
is an index of technology in the production of consumption good
in the country (consisting of all regions).
Therefore, the marginal cost of consumption-good production (Equation 2.8) can be rewritten
as:
MCCr =
 
ACr
 1W
l
l
PGr
g
g
=

W
ACr l

1
AC
1
g

   1
 g
1 g
Similarly, the marginal cost of public-good production (Equation 2.11) can be rewritten as:
MCPr =
 
APr
 1W
l
l
P Pr
g
g
=

W
APr l

1
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g

   1
 g
1 g
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This implies that the total amount of prots in all regions is:
  =
X
r
r
=
X
r
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
Pr;r  MCCr

=
1
   1
X
r
Y Cr MC
C
r
=

1
   1

W
l

1
AC
1
g

   1
 g
1 g X
r
Y Cr
ACr
Hence, the per-capita dividend payment is
  (h) =
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H
=
1
H
1
   1
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Combining Equation 2.3, 2.4 and 2.15, one can obtain an expression for per capita consumption
in region r:
CCr (h) =
  (h)
 
1  tDr

PCr (1 + t
C
r )
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Combining the rst line of this with Equations 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 results in:
CCr (h) =
  
1  tDr

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H (1 + tCr ) 
!X
r
Y Cr
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(5.7)
which implies through using the second line of Equation 5.6 thatX
r
Y Cr
ACr
=
HPLr Y
L
r f
L
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Furthermore, combining Equations 2.3, 2.4, 2.15, 5.5, and 5.8 results in:
PLr = W (5.9)
for all r, which suggests that land prices are equalized across regions, and they are equal to the
national wage rate. This implies thatX
r
Y Cr
ACr
=
HY Lr f
L
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 
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

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which suggests an expression for the ratio of population levels across regions r and i:
Hr
Hi
=
Y Lr f
L
r
 
1 + tLr
  
1  tDi

Y Li f
L
i (1 + t
L
i ) (1  tDr )
(5.11)
By using Equations 2.5, 5.3, and 5.4, we can write the ratio of consumption-goods for regions,
say, a and b that:
CCa
CCb
=
Ha
 
1 + tCb
  
1  tDa

Hb (1 + tCa ) (1  tDb )
(5.12)
By using Equations 2.14, 5.1, 5.4, Pr;i = Pi;i (1 +  r;i), and r;i = (1 +  r;i)
( 1), we can write
the goods traded from region i to region r as follows:
CCr;i =

CCr
1 +  r;i

ACi
AC

which implies that the ratio of imports of region i from regions a and b is:
CCi;a
CCi;b
=

1 +  i;b
1 +  i;a

ACa
ACb

which is an expression for interregional trade suggesting that a destination region imports more
goods from closer and high-tech (i.e., low-cost) regions.
Using Equation 5.12, it is implied that the ratio of exports of region i to regions a and b is:
CCa;i
CCb;i
=
(1 +  b;i)Ha
 
1 + tCb
   
1  tDa

(1 + a;i)Hb (1 + tCa ) ((1  tDb ))
which suggests that a source region exports more goods to closer, higher populated, lower-sales-tax,
or lower-dividend-income-tax regions.
Remember the market clearing condition (i.e., Equation 2.22):
Y Cr =
X
i
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(5.13)
where the second equality is due to i;r = (1 +  i;r)
( 1). This implies that the consumption-good
production ratio of regions a and b is given by:
Y Ca
Y Cb
=

Pa;a
Pb;b
 
=

ACa
ACb

(5.14)
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where we have used Equation 5.3. This says that the relative private-sector production of a region
is directly related to its production technology.
As indicated by Equation 2.24, the total cost of public good is restricted by the amount of
taxes collected. Combining Equations 2.3, 2.4, and 2.24 the public-good production in region r
can be rewritten as
Y Pr = HrA
P
r   (h)
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which implies that the public-good production ratio of regions a and b can be written as:
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From the cost-minimization problem of the consumption-good producing rms, it is known
that:
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Y Cr
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
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and
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which imply through Equation 5.3 that
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Using Equation 2.4, the total supply of workers in the country can be expressed as:X
r
HrNr (h) =
X
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(5.18)
In equilibrium, total labor demand should be equal to total labor supply:X
r
LCr| {z }
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X
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which can be rewritten using Equations 2.4, 5.16 and 5.17 as
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By combining Equations 5.5 and 5.15, we can write:
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which means that  X
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Combining this with Equations 5.5 and 5.20, after some basic algebra, gives:
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which implies that
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In a special case in which taxes are zero (and, thus, there is no public-good production or con-
sumption), we have:
l =
1

which suggests that labor share in production is equal to the net markup in the absence of taxes
and/or a public sector. This implies that
g = 1  l
=
   1

which suggests that the intermediate-input share in production is also related to the elasticity of
substitution across goods in the absence of taxes and/or a public sector.
Combining Equation 5.10 with Equation 5.22 results in the following expression for the public
good produced in region r:
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The cost-minimization problem of the consumption-good producing rm results in the following
demand for intermediate inputs:
GCr =
gWLCr
lP
=
Y Cr
ACr

P
W
l
g
g 1
By using Equations 5.4 and 5.23, the last expression can be rewritten as:
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
   1

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Similarly, for the intermediate input of the public sector, we can write
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
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Hence
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P
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Now, in Equation 5.13, we have information for CCi for all i (through Equation 5.7), for G
C
i for
all i (through Equation 5.24), and for GPi for all i (through Equation 5.25). Hence Equation 5.13
can be rewritten as:
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Combining this with Equation 5.21 results in:
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Combining Equations 5.10 and 5.26 results in an expression for the production of consumption
good in region r:
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which implies that the ratio of production of consumption good across regions r and i is:
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Recall individual utility in Equation 2.1 which is supposed to be the same across regions
according to Equation 2.20. Using Equation 2.3, 2.4, 2.15, 5.7, 5.21, 5.5, Equation 2.1 can be
rewritten as:
Ur (h)  log
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When individual utilities are the same across regions, we have the following individual-utility ratio
across regions r and i:
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Combining this with Equation 5.9 results in the equilibrium ratio of public-good production tech-
nologies across regions r and i:
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where the right hand side consists of region-specic taxes only.
6. Appendix B: Closed-Form Solution Summary
This section provides a summary of the closed-form solution of all region-specic endogenous vari-
ables in terms of region-specic exogenous variables and parameters which are tax rates, technology
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levels (of both private and public sectors), iceberg trade costs, land sizes, elasticity of substitution
across goods, the fraction of land that is supplied, and total population in all regions. After setting
W = 1 as the numeraire, we have the following closed-form expressions:
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Table 1 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to Wage-Income Tax Rates
STATE CON LAN PUB HOW POP WEL CON LAN PUB HOW POP WEL
Alabama -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.66 1.69 0.00 -0.05
Alaska -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 0.00 0.00 1.68 1.69 0.00 -0.02
Arizona -1.59 0.00 -0.38 1.80 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.75 1.80 0.00 -0.08
Arkansas -1.59 0.00 -0.26 1.92 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.89 1.92 0.00 -0.04
California -1.59 0.00 -0.23 1.95 0.00 -3.77 -0.21 0.00 1.73 1.95 0.00 -0.43
Colorado -1.59 0.00 -0.35 1.83 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.80 1.83 0.00 -0.06
Connecticut -1.59 0.00 -0.33 1.85 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.81 1.85 0.00 -0.05
Delaware -1.59 0.00 -0.31 1.86 0.00 -3.77 0.00 0.00 1.85 1.86 0.00 -0.02
Washington DC -1.59 0.00 -0.26 1.92 0.00 -3.77 0.00 0.00 1.90 1.92 0.00 -0.02
Florida -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.09 0.00 1.59 1.69 0.00 -0.19
Georgia -1.59 0.00 -0.30 1.88 0.00 -3.77 -0.05 0.00 1.82 1.88 0.00 -0.12
Hawaii -1.59 0.00 -0.23 1.95 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.93 1.95 0.00 -0.02
Idaho -1.59 0.00 -0.23 1.95 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.92 1.95 0.00 -0.03
Illinois -1.59 0.00 -0.40 1.78 0.00 -3.77 -0.07 0.00 1.70 1.78 0.00 -0.15
Indiana -1.59 0.00 -0.39 1.79 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.75 1.79 0.00 -0.08
Iowa -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.66 1.69 0.00 -0.04
Kansas -1.59 0.00 -0.28 1.90 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.86 1.90 0.00 -0.05
Kentucky -1.59 0.00 -0.31 1.87 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.84 1.87 0.00 -0.06
Louisiana -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.66 1.69 0.00 -0.05
Maine -1.59 0.00 -0.21 1.97 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.95 1.97 0.00 -0.03
Maryland -1.59 0.00 -0.34 1.84 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.80 1.84 0.00 -0.07
Massachusetts -1.59 0.00 -0.32 1.86 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.81 1.86 0.00 -0.08
Michigan -1.59 0.00 -0.37 1.81 0.00 -3.77 -0.05 0.00 1.74 1.81 0.00 -0.12
Minnesota -1.59 0.00 -0.26 1.92 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.87 1.92 0.00 -0.07
Mississippi -1.59 0.00 -0.33 1.85 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.82 1.85 0.00 -0.04
Missouri -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.65 1.69 0.00 -0.07
Montana -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 0.00 0.00 1.68 1.69 0.00 -0.02
Nebraska -1.59 0.00 -0.27 1.91 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.88 1.91 0.00 -0.04
Nevada -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.67 1.69 0.00 -0.03
New Hampshire -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.67 1.69 0.00 -0.03
New Jersey -1.59 0.00 -0.38 1.80 0.00 -3.77 -0.05 0.00 1.73 1.80 0.00 -0.11
New Mexico -1.59 0.00 -0.32 1.86 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.84 1.86 0.00 -0.03
New York -1.59 0.00 -0.27 1.91 0.00 -3.77 -0.11 0.00 1.79 1.91 0.00 -0.24
North Carolina -1.59 0.00 -0.26 1.92 0.00 -3.77 -0.05 0.00 1.85 1.92 0.00 -0.12
North Dakota -1.59 0.00 -0.37 1.81 0.00 -3.77 0.00 0.00 1.79 1.81 0.00 -0.02
Ohio -1.59 0.00 -0.36 1.81 0.00 -3.77 -0.06 0.00 1.74 1.81 0.00 -0.14
Oklahoma -1.59 0.00 -0.29 1.89 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.86 1.89 0.00 -0.05
Oregon -1.59 0.00 -0.19 1.99 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.96 1.99 0.00 -0.06
Pennsylvania -1.59 0.00 -0.40 1.78 0.00 -3.77 -0.07 0.00 1.70 1.78 0.00 -0.15
Rhode Island -1.59 0.00 -0.26 1.92 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.89 1.92 0.00 -0.03
South Carolina -1.59 0.00 -0.26 1.92 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.88 1.92 0.00 -0.06
South Dakota -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 0.00 0.00 1.67 1.69 0.00 -0.02
Tennessee -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.65 1.69 0.00 -0.07
Texas -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.12 0.00 1.56 1.69 0.00 -0.25
Utah -1.59 0.00 -0.26 1.92 0.00 -3.77 -0.02 0.00 1.89 1.92 0.00 -0.04
Vermont -1.59 0.00 -0.26 1.92 0.00 -3.77 0.00 0.00 1.90 1.92 0.00 -0.03
Virginia -1.59 0.00 -0.31 1.87 0.00 -3.77 -0.04 0.00 1.82 1.87 0.00 -0.10
Washington -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.65 1.69 0.00 -0.07
West Virginia -1.59 0.00 -0.35 1.83 0.00 -3.77 -0.01 0.00 1.81 1.83 0.00 -0.03
Wisconsin -1.59 0.00 -0.28 1.90 0.00 -3.77 -0.03 0.00 1.85 1.90 0.00 -0.08
Wyoming -1.59 0.00 -0.49 1.69 0.00 -3.77 0.00 0.00 1.68 1.69 0.00 -0.01
NATIONWIDE WAGE-INCOME TAX RATES STATE-LEVEL WAGE-INCOME TAX RATES
Notes: CON stands for per capita consumption good, LAN for per capita land, PUB for per capita public good, HOW for per capita hours 
of work, POP for population, WEL for welfare measured by individual utility.
Table 2 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to Dividend-Income Tax Rates
STATE CON LAN PUB HOW POP WEL CON LAN PUB HOW POP WEL
Alabama 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.63 -1.66 1.72 -1.66 1.66 0.09
Alaska 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.68 -1.69 1.66 -1.69 1.69 -0.02
Arizona 2.04 0.04 3.21 0.04 -0.04 5.25 -1.72 -1.76 1.84 -1.76 1.76 0.12
Arkansas 1.92 -0.08 3.32 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.88 -1.90 1.91 -1.90 1.90 0.04
California 1.88 -0.12 3.36 -0.12 0.12 5.25 -1.46 -1.72 2.40 -1.72 1.72 0.94
Colorado 2.00 0.00 3.24 0.00 0.00 5.25 -1.77 -1.80 1.86 -1.80 1.80 0.09
Connecticut 1.99 -0.01 3.25 -0.01 0.01 5.25 -1.80 -1.82 1.82 -1.82 1.82 0.02
Delaware 1.97 -0.03 3.27 -0.03 0.03 5.25 -1.85 -1.86 1.84 -1.86 1.86 -0.01
Washington DC 1.92 -0.08 3.32 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.91 -1.91 1.89 -1.91 1.91 -0.02
Florida 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.48 -1.59 1.87 -1.59 1.59 0.39
Georgia 1.96 -0.05 3.29 -0.05 0.05 5.25 -1.76 -1.82 1.96 -1.82 1.82 0.20
Hawaii 1.89 -0.12 3.36 -0.12 0.12 5.25 -1.93 -1.94 1.94 -1.94 1.94 0.00
Idaho 1.89 -0.11 3.35 -0.11 0.11 5.25 -1.93 -1.94 1.92 -1.94 1.94 -0.01
Illinois 2.06 0.05 3.19 0.05 -0.05 5.25 -1.62 -1.70 1.87 -1.70 1.70 0.25
Indiana 2.05 0.04 3.20 0.04 -0.04 5.25 -1.71 -1.75 1.82 -1.75 1.75 0.11
Iowa 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.65 -1.67 1.68 -1.67 1.67 0.02
Kansas 1.94 -0.06 3.30 -0.06 0.06 5.25 -1.86 -1.88 1.87 -1.88 1.88 0.01
Kentucky 1.96 -0.04 3.28 -0.04 0.04 5.25 -1.82 -1.85 1.88 -1.85 1.85 0.07
Louisiana 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.64 -1.66 1.72 -1.66 1.66 0.08
Maine 1.86 -0.14 3.38 -0.14 0.14 5.25 -1.95 -1.96 1.93 -1.96 1.96 -0.03
Maryland 2.00 0.00 3.25 0.00 0.00 5.25 -1.76 -1.80 1.87 -1.80 1.80 0.10
Massachusetts 1.72 -0.28 3.53 -0.28 0.28 5.25 -2.02 -2.07 2.15 -2.07 2.07 0.13
Michigan 2.03 0.03 3.22 0.03 -0.03 5.25 -1.68 -1.75 1.87 -1.75 1.75 0.19
Minnesota 1.92 -0.08 3.33 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.85 -1.88 1.93 -1.88 1.88 0.08
Mississippi 1.99 -0.01 3.25 -0.01 0.01 5.25 -1.81 -1.83 1.85 -1.83 1.83 0.04
Missouri 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.62 -1.66 1.72 -1.66 1.66 0.10
Montana 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.68 -1.68 1.67 -1.68 1.68 -0.01
Nebraska 1.93 -0.08 3.32 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.89 -1.90 1.85 -1.90 1.90 -0.04
Nevada 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.66 -1.67 1.69 -1.67 1.67 0.03
New Hampshire 1.99 -0.01 3.25 -0.01 0.01 5.25 -1.83 -1.84 1.80 -1.84 1.84 -0.03
New Jersey 2.04 0.04 3.20 0.04 -0.04 5.25 -1.69 -1.74 1.84 -1.74 1.74 0.15
New Mexico 1.98 -0.02 3.26 -0.02 0.02 5.25 -1.83 -1.84 1.84 -1.84 1.84 0.01
New York 1.93 -0.08 3.32 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.65 -1.79 2.11 -1.79 1.79 0.45
North Carolina 1.92 -0.08 3.32 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.80 -1.86 1.99 -1.86 1.86 0.19
North Dakota 2.03 0.02 3.22 0.02 -0.02 5.25 -1.80 -1.81 1.76 -1.81 1.81 -0.05
Ohio 2.02 0.02 3.22 0.02 -0.02 5.25 -1.67 -1.74 1.90 -1.74 1.74 0.23
Oklahoma 1.95 -0.05 3.30 -0.05 0.05 5.25 -1.84 -1.87 1.89 -1.87 1.87 0.05
Oregon 1.85 -0.16 3.40 -0.16 0.16 5.25 -1.94 -1.97 1.99 -1.97 1.97 0.05
Pennsylvania 2.06 0.05 3.19 0.05 -0.05 5.25 -1.63 -1.71 1.88 -1.71 1.71 0.25
Rhode Island 1.92 -0.08 3.32 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.90 -1.91 1.87 -1.91 1.91 -0.04
South Carolina 1.92 -0.08 3.32 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.86 -1.89 1.93 -1.89 1.89 0.08
South Dakota 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.68 -1.68 1.65 -1.68 1.68 -0.03
Tennessee 1.96 -0.05 3.29 -0.05 0.05 5.25 -1.80 -1.84 1.92 -1.84 1.84 0.12
Texas 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.41 -1.55 1.91 -1.55 1.55 0.50
Utah 1.92 -0.08 3.32 -0.08 0.08 5.25 -1.88 -1.90 1.91 -1.90 1.90 0.03
Vermont 1.91 -0.09 3.33 -0.09 0.09 5.25 -1.91 -1.92 1.85 -1.92 1.92 -0.06
Virginia 1.97 -0.04 3.28 -0.04 0.04 5.25 -1.77 -1.82 1.93 -1.82 1.82 0.16
Washington 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.61 -1.65 1.73 -1.65 1.65 0.12
West Virginia 2.01 0.01 3.24 0.01 -0.01 5.25 -1.81 -1.82 1.82 -1.82 1.82 0.01
Wisconsin 1.94 -0.06 3.31 -0.06 0.06 5.25 -1.82 -1.86 1.89 -1.86 1.86 0.07
Wyoming 2.15 0.14 3.10 0.14 -0.14 5.25 -1.68 -1.69 1.67 -1.69 1.69 -0.02
NATIONWIDE DIVIDEND-INCOME TAX RATES STATE-LEVEL DIVIDEND-INCOME TAX RATES
Notes: CON stands for per capita consumption good, LAN for per capita land, PUB for per capita public good, HOW for per capita hours 
of work, POP for population, WEL for welfare measured by individual utility.
Table 3 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to Property Tax Rates
STATE CON LAN PUB HOW POP WEL CON LAN PUB HOW POP WEL
Alabama 0.42 -0.25 0.68 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.01 -0.66 0.67 0.01 0.66 0.01
Alaska 0.42 0.05 0.38 0.42 -0.05 0.43 0.00 -0.36 0.36 0.00 0.36 -0.01
Arizona 0.42 -0.12 0.55 0.42 0.12 0.43 0.01 -0.53 0.54 0.01 0.53 0.02
Arkansas 0.42 -0.14 0.57 0.42 0.14 0.43 0.01 -0.55 0.55 0.01 0.55 0.00
California 0.42 -0.13 0.56 0.42 0.13 0.43 0.07 -0.48 0.60 0.07 0.48 0.12
Colorado 0.42 -0.10 0.53 0.42 0.10 0.43 0.01 -0.50 0.51 0.01 0.50 0.01
Connecticut 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.42 -0.11 0.43 0.00 -0.30 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.00
Delaware 0.42 -0.18 0.61 0.42 0.18 0.43 0.00 -0.59 0.59 0.00 0.59 0.00
Washington DC 0.42 -0.19 0.62 0.42 0.19 0.43 0.00 -0.60 0.60 0.00 0.60 -0.01
Florida 0.42 -0.02 0.45 0.42 0.02 0.43 0.03 -0.41 0.45 0.03 0.41 0.04
Georgia 0.42 -0.03 0.46 0.42 0.03 0.43 0.01 -0.43 0.45 0.01 0.43 0.02
Hawaii 0.42 -0.31 0.74 0.42 0.31 0.43 0.00 -0.73 0.72 0.00 0.73 0.00
Idaho 0.42 -0.06 0.49 0.42 0.06 0.43 0.00 -0.47 0.47 0.00 0.47 0.00
Illinois 0.42 0.13 0.30 0.42 -0.13 0.43 0.01 -0.27 0.29 0.01 0.27 0.02
Indiana 0.42 0.03 0.40 0.42 -0.03 0.43 0.01 -0.38 0.39 0.01 0.38 0.01
Iowa 0.42 0.09 0.34 0.42 -0.09 0.43 0.00 -0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00
Kansas 0.42 0.08 0.34 0.42 -0.08 0.43 0.00 -0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00
Kentucky 0.42 -0.05 0.48 0.42 0.05 0.43 0.01 -0.46 0.47 0.01 0.46 0.01
Louisiana 0.42 -0.39 0.82 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.01 -0.79 0.81 0.01 0.79 0.02
Maine 0.42 0.04 0.39 0.42 -0.04 0.43 0.00 -0.37 0.36 0.00 0.37 -0.01
Maryland 0.42 -0.05 0.48 0.42 0.05 0.43 0.01 -0.46 0.47 0.01 0.46 0.01
Massachusetts 0.42 0.01 0.42 0.42 -0.01 0.43 0.01 -0.39 0.40 0.01 0.39 0.01
Michigan 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.42 -0.11 0.43 0.01 -0.30 0.31 0.01 0.30 0.01
Minnesota 0.42 0.01 0.42 0.42 -0.01 0.43 0.01 -0.40 0.40 0.01 0.40 0.01
Mississippi 0.42 -0.14 0.57 0.42 0.14 0.43 0.01 -0.55 0.56 0.01 0.55 0.00
Missouri 0.42 0.00 0.43 0.42 0.00 0.43 0.01 -0.41 0.42 0.01 0.41 0.01
Montana 0.42 -0.01 0.44 0.42 0.01 0.43 0.00 -0.42 0.42 0.00 0.42 0.00
Nebraska 0.42 0.16 0.27 0.42 -0.16 0.43 0.00 -0.26 0.25 0.00 0.26 -0.01
Nevada 0.42 -0.12 0.55 0.42 0.12 0.43 0.00 -0.53 0.53 0.00 0.53 0.00
New Hampshire 0.42 0.15 0.28 0.42 -0.15 0.43 0.00 -0.27 0.26 0.00 0.27 -0.01
New Jersey 0.42 0.14 0.29 0.42 -0.14 0.43 0.01 -0.26 0.27 0.01 0.26 0.01
New Mexico 0.42 -0.13 0.56 0.42 0.13 0.43 0.00 -0.54 0.54 0.00 0.54 0.00
New York 0.42 0.06 0.37 0.42 -0.06 0.43 0.02 -0.33 0.37 0.02 0.33 0.04
North Carolina 0.42 -0.03 0.46 0.42 0.03 0.43 0.01 -0.43 0.45 0.01 0.43 0.02
North Dakota 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.42 -0.11 0.43 0.00 -0.30 0.30 0.00 0.30 -0.01
Ohio 0.42 0.10 0.33 0.42 -0.10 0.43 0.01 -0.31 0.32 0.01 0.31 0.02
Oklahoma 0.42 -0.05 0.48 0.42 0.05 0.43 0.01 -0.46 0.46 0.01 0.46 0.00
Oregon 0.42 -0.02 0.45 0.42 0.02 0.43 0.01 -0.43 0.43 0.01 0.43 0.00
Pennsylvania 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.42 -0.11 0.43 0.01 -0.29 0.31 0.01 0.29 0.02
Rhode Island 0.42 0.07 0.36 0.42 -0.07 0.43 0.00 -0.35 0.34 0.00 0.35 -0.01
South Carolina 0.42 -0.10 0.53 0.42 0.10 0.43 0.01 -0.51 0.52 0.01 0.51 0.01
South Dakota 0.42 0.10 0.33 0.42 -0.10 0.43 0.00 -0.32 0.31 0.00 0.32 -0.01
Tennessee 0.42 -0.05 0.48 0.42 0.05 0.43 0.01 -0.46 0.47 0.01 0.46 0.01
Texas 0.42 0.17 0.26 0.42 -0.17 0.43 0.02 -0.23 0.26 0.02 0.23 0.03
Utah 0.42 -0.10 0.53 0.42 0.10 0.43 0.00 -0.51 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.00
Vermont 0.42 0.13 0.30 0.42 -0.13 0.43 0.00 -0.28 0.27 0.00 0.28 -0.01
Virginia 0.42 -0.06 0.49 0.42 0.06 0.43 0.01 -0.47 0.48 0.01 0.47 0.02
Washington 0.42 -0.01 0.44 0.42 0.01 0.43 0.01 -0.42 0.43 0.01 0.42 0.01
West Virginia 0.42 -0.15 0.58 0.42 0.15 0.43 0.00 -0.56 0.56 0.00 0.56 0.00
Wisconsin 0.42 0.15 0.28 0.42 -0.15 0.43 0.00 -0.26 0.26 0.00 0.26 0.00
Wyoming 0.42 -0.13 0.56 0.42 0.13 0.43 0.00 -0.54 0.54 0.00 0.54 -0.01
NATIONWIDE PROPERTY TAX RATES STATE-LEVEL PROPERTY TAX RATES
Notes: CON stands for per capita consumption good, LAN for per capita land, PUB for per capita public good, HOW for per capita hours 
of work, POP for population, WEL for welfare measured by individual utility.
Table 4 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to Sales Tax Rates
STATE CON LAN PUB HOW POP WEL CON LAN PUB HOW POP WEL
Alabama -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00
Alaska -0.82 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.99 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Arizona -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arkansas -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
California -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.92 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.03
Colorado -0.79 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.96 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
Connecticut -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Delaware -0.82 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Washington DC -0.76 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Florida -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.01
Georgia -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hawaii -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.96 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Idaho -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Illinois -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indiana -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
Iowa -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Kansas -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Kentucky -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Louisiana -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maine -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Maryland -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00
Massachusetts -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Michigan -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
Minnesota -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Mississippi -0.75 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Missouri -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00
Montana -0.82 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Nebraska -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Nevada -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Hampshire -0.82 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.99 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 -0.02
New Jersey -0.75 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 -0.01
New Mexico -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 -0.01
New York -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.01
North Carolina -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00
North Dakota -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Ohio -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00
Oklahoma -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Oregon -0.82 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.99 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Pennsylvania -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rhode Island -0.75 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 -0.01
South Carolina -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 -0.01
South Dakota -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.96 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Tennessee -0.75 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00
Texas -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.92 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.01
Utah -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Vermont -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Virginia -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.95 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00
Washington -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.93 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
West Virginia -0.76 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Wisconsin -0.77 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Wyoming -0.78 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.96 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 -0.01
NATIONWIDE SALES TAX RATES STATE-LEVEL SALES TAX RATES
Notes: CON stands for per capita consumption good, LAN for per capita land, PUB for per capita public good, HOW for per capita hours 
of work, POP for population, WEL for welfare measured by individual utility.
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Figure 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
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Figure 2 – Model versus Data 
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Correlation = 0.96 
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 Figure 3 - Elasticities of National Variables with respect to Tax Rates 
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Figure 4 - Elasticities of National Variables with respect to Tax Rates (g = 0) 
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Figure 5 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to Nationwide Wage-Income Tax Rates 
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Figure 6 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to Nationwide Dividend-Income Tax Rates 
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Figure 7 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to Nationwide Property Tax Rates 
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Figure 8 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to Nationwide Sales Tax Rates 
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Figure 9 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to State-Level Wage-Income Tax Rates 
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Figure 10 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to State-Level Dividend-Income Tax Rates 
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Figure 11 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to State-Level Property Tax Rates 
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Figure 12 - Elasticities of Endogenous Variables with respect to State-Level Sales Tax Rates 
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